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Abstract 
 In South Africa, land/housing is a finite non-shareable type of 
property that must yield to stringent constitutional control to meet 
land reform and housing objectives, which is high on our 
constitutional agenda to redress injustices of the past and allow 
the previously dispossessed to take their rightful place in society. 
This article considers the normative framework that underlies the 
types of property that must be regulated for the purposes of 
section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, since very few cases have been decided in such a way as 
to consider, from a normative perspective when land/housing 
should be subject to greater governmental control and when not. 
Even in the context of expropriation without compensation, 
certain types of land/buildings are being flagged for this purpose, 
but the normative reasons for such propositions remain unclear. 
The purpose of this article is to offer a theoretical perspective, 
based on work done by progressive-property scholars, on the 
normative foundation of some property rights, with the object of 
initiating a dialogue concerning whether or not such rights 
should be regulated. The notion of human flourishing, as 
developed by Alexander, should arguably be essential in 
determining whether land/housing rights should be subject to 
greater constitutional scrutiny; the more property contributes to 
the individual's autonomy and ability to partake in social 
relations, the more sceptical we should be of severe 
governmental interference; whereas the lesser the notion of 
human flourishing appears, the greater governmental 
interference should be. An approach of this kind adheres to the 
systemic purpose of section 25 of the Constitution, because the 
property clause is intended to regulate established rights just as 
much as it is intended to meet certain societal needs. 
Keywords 
Human flourishing; property regulation; housing rights; land 
reform; progressive property theory. 
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1 Introduction 
In South Africa, the distribution of land, including the provision of housing, 
is high on the constitutional agenda, not only as a core function in our aim 
to redress the injustices of the past, but also as a means to allow the 
previously dispossessed to take their rightful place in society. Of course, 
land/housing is considered to be a finite, non-shareable type of property that 
must yield to greater constitutional control in order to meet land reform and 
housing objectives. Property rights of this kind must therefore be strictly 
regulated, as permitted in section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996.1 The purpose of this article is not to scrutinise the formal 
requirements for such governmental impositions, but rather to look at the 
normative framework that underlies the types of property that must be 
regulated. Limited scholarly work has been undertaken in this area of 
constitutional property law, because very few cases have in fact been 
decided in such a way as to consider, from a normative perspective, when 
land/housing should be subject to greater governmental control, and when 
not. In the recent politically-motivated milieu where the expropriation of land 
without compensation is being proposed, certain types of land/buildings are 
being flagged for this purpose, but the normative reasons for such 
propositions remain unclear.2 
                                            
* Sue-Mari Viljoen. BComm (Law) LLB LLD (US), South Africa. Associate Professor 
in the Department of Public, Constitutional and International Law, UNISA, South 
Africa. E-mail: maasss@unisa.ac.za. A version of this paper was presented at the 
annual meeting of the Association for Law, Property and Society (ALPS) in June 
2018, Maastricht. Thank you to the participants for their thoughts and discussions 
around this topic. I would also like to express my gratitude to the UNISA College of 
Law for the grant that enabled me to attend this conference. This work is based on 
research supported in part by the National Research Foundation of South Africa. 
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be 
attributed to any of these institutions. 
1  Throughout this piece a distinction is drawn between "severe" regulatory 
interferences and non-intrusive, "everyday" deprivations. The former suggests the 
kind of governmental interference that affects the owner's entitlements in such a way 
that he is effectively deprived of all use and enjoyment. Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC), and to some extent President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) serve as 
examples of such "severe" regulatory interferences. Expropriations also fall under 
this category. 
2  See specifically s 12(3) of the Draft Expropriation Bill, 2019 in GN 1409 in GG 42127 
of 21 December 2018. Also see Mahlase and Madia 2018 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/gauteng-prepares-to-expropriate-
privately-owned-land-without-compensation-20180615, where it is suggested by the 
Gauteng Premier, David Makhura, that unused land will be expropriated without 
compensation. Also see Schreuder 2018 https://citizen.co.za/news/ 
opinion/1990467/which-land-is-most-likely-to-be-expropriated-first/, where it is 
suggested that state-owned land, abandoned buildings in city centres, informal 
settlements, abandoned mines and smallholdings (and promising farms) will first be 
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The purpose of this article is to provide a theoretical perspective, based on 
the work done by progressive-property theorists (specifically the notion of 
human flourishing as developed by Alexander) on certain types of property 
and the ways in which they are used, to determine whether or not they 
should be subject to more severe forms of governmental control. An 
analysis of this kind is by no means premature since some cases already 
indicate some inclination to protect some kinds of property more stringently 
than others. However, the reasons for doing so remain obscure. From a 
theoretical perspective, the justification for protecting some types of 
property more rigorously than others may take the form of a fact-based, 
circumstantial analysis. Predetermined rules in the context of socio-
economic reform are likely to be counter-intuitive, because every case must 
be scrutinised in accordance with its unique circumstances. This does not 
mean that we should refrain from taking part in a constructive dialogue to 
set certain standards that are particularly relevant to this sensitive part of 
our journey towards constitutional reform. Some suggestions are made in 
this regard to initiate a way forward that is equitable, fair and mindful of 
everyone's human dignity. 
2  Human flourishing as part of the progressive property 
theory 
In stark contrast to the classical liberal theory of property, which is 
embedded in the idea that the core purpose of property is to provide the 
material substratum to allow individuals to express themelves within their 
given communities and consequently serve individual autonomy, is that of 
the social function of property.3 From the beginning of the twentieth century, 
authors such as Duguit4 argued that property is more a social function than 
a right. In terms of this concept, property is both internally and externally 
limited, a notion which sits well with the idea that owners have obligations 
with respect to their property. They cannot simply do with their property as 
they please. Within this framework, the state is tasked with protecting 
owners when they fulfil this social function, whereas owners who fail to 
adhere to the social obligations placed upon them (by the mere fact of their 
ownership) should either be punished or encouraged by the state to adhere 
to their obligations. Governmental tools such as taxation and expropriation 
are useful measures in this regard. Overall, the social function of property 
suggests that the state has both positive and negative duties with respect 
to property.5 Central to the theory that property serves a social function is 
                                            
flagged for expropriation without compensation. It is also suggested that houses in 
suburban areas will likely not be targeted first. 
3  Foster and Bonilla 2011 Fordham L Rev 1003-1004. 
4  See Duguit Las Transformaciones del Derecho Publico y Privado 236. 
5  Foster and Bonilla 2011 Fordham L Rev 1005. 
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the dismissal of the assumption, anchored in classical liberal property, that 
property exists to serve individual interests. Instead, property must be put 
to the service of the community, which means that it should be put into 
production.6 More recently, a number of property law scholars have 
reiterated the social function of property in their theoretical work on the 
"social obligation" norm of property, which centres on the idea that property 
owners have social responsibilities to others.7 
Alexander8 defines "human flourishing" as the opportunity for a person to 
live as fulfilling a life as possible,9 which is also the normative foundation of 
property.10 In terms of this theory, the purpose of property law is to promote 
human flourishing for owners as well as non-owners.11 Peñalver12 explains 
that human flourishing has a strong individualistic dimension since property, 
and the very purpose thereof, is to enable individuals "to foster the goods of 
practical reason and autonomy". The individual is essentially unable to 
flourish if he is denied some physical space where he can exercise the most 
basic activities necessary for human survival.13 Arguments have been put 
                                            
6  Foster and Bonilla 2011 Fordham L Rev 1007, referring to Duguit Las 
Transformaciones del Derecho Publico y Privado 237. 
7  See for instance Alexander 2009a Cornell L Rev 745-819; Singer Entitlement. 
8  Alexander 2014 Iowa L Rev 1260. Alexander's human flourishing theory rests on two 
characteristics, firstly that human beings can develop the capabilities that are 
necessary for a well-lived life only within society with other human beings; and, 
secondly, that human flourishing includes the ability to make choices among 
alternative life horizons. The individual should be able to deliberate about differences 
between such alternatives and the values that they represent: Alexander and 
Peñalver 2009 Theoretical Inquires in Law; Alexander 2009a Cornell LR 760-773. 
According to Alexander, human flourishing is both pluralistic (meaning that there is 
no single moral value to which all other values can be reduced) and objectivist 
(meaning that value determinations are not simply a matter of "agent sovereignty"). 
9  Alexander 2013 HKLJ 453. Human flourishing includes "individual autonomy, 
personal security/privacy, personhood, self-determination, community and equality". 
Human flourishing is concerned with what an individual can do, rather than what 
he/she has. A life worth living is measured by the individual's capabilities, more so 
than his/her possessions. However, a person's life "cannot go well unless he at least 
possesses certain essential capabilities": Alexander 2013 HKLJ 456. 
10  Alexander 2013 HKLJ 451 mentions that the "moral foundation" of property is human 
flourishing. Elsewhere, Alexander also stresses that the core of property is complex 
and that it cannot be depicted as the right of owners to exclude others from their 
property. Instead, Alexander's idea of property is intrinsically complicated since he 
posits that property serves a number of values that should be understood in 
pluralistic terms. These values include individual liberty, human dignity, just social 
relations and self-development: Alexander 2009b Cornell L Rev 1064-1066. 
11  Peñalver 2008 Cornell L Rev 828. Alexander 2013 HKLJ 452. 
12  Peñalver 2008 Cornell L Rev 870. Also see Underkuffler 2007 Cornell L Rev 1244, 
where property is explained as a right that "not only protects us against government 
interference, but also against all others. It is by its very nature, bound up with ideas 
of individual separation, individual isolation, individual autonomy, and individual 
control." 
13  Peñalver 2008 Cornell L Rev 880. 
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forward to suggest that certain property interests should receive greater 
protection on the basis that they allow their holders to flourish since they 
provide a platform where self-realisation can take place.14 The home is 
considered to be an essential property interest in the overall pursuit of 
allowing individuals to flourish since it is considered to be "the central locus 
for developing and experiencing all, or nearly all, of the capabilities 
necessary for human flourishing".15 
On the other hand, non-owners are also, as a matter of human dignity, 
entitled to flourish.16 Alexander's17 social-obligation norm is inherent in the 
very concpet of ownership, meaning that 
... when the law, whether by way of statutes, administrative action or judicial 
decisions, announces some restriction on an owner's use of her land or 
building, insofar as that announcement restates what is already part of the 
social-obligation norm, it is simply a legal recognition of a restriction that is 
inherent in the concept of ownership rather than being externally imposed and 
engrafted upon the owner's bundle of rights. 
Human flourishing is therefore not purely individualistic since the realisation 
thereof is largely dependent on a material as well as a communal 
infrastructure, which is mainly established by others. In this framework of 
allowing individuals to live a life of purpose and value, decisions that relate 
to the use of property, and even more so land (as well as buildings), impact 
on the ideal of human flourishing, since these types of property constitute 
an important element of human activities.18 Moreover, owners' social 
obligations towards members of various communities are not static. They 
will adapt to changes in a given society as the society grows and becomes 
more complex.19  
Alexander20 further argues that the values that are associated with the 
institution of private property, including individual autonomy, personal 
security and self-determination, are not at odds with fundamental public 
                                            
14  Foster and Bonilla 2011 Fordham L Rev. See specifically Radin 1982 Stan L Rev for 
the argument that "personal" property, which is "bound up" with a person's 
personhood, should receive a heightened level of protection than "fungible" property, 
which is held by persons for purely commercial reasons. Personal property is on 
some level "personally" connected to the individual on the basis that it both 
contributes to the holder's self-development and allows him to participate in society 
as a fulfilled individual. 
15  Alexander 2009a Cornell L Rev 816. 
16  Alexander and Peñalver 2009 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 140-141. Also see Rose 
1995 Notre Dame L Rev 329-330 for the argument that property is generally 
perceived as an economic right on the basis that it generates wealth, suggesting that 
this right is not at the core of the government. 
17  Alexander 2013 HKLJ 453. 
18  Peñalver 2008 Cornell L Rev 876. 
19  Alexander 2013 HKLJ 453. 
20  Alexander 2014 Iowa L Rev 1260. 
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values. The notion of human flourishing therefore includes private and 
public values, suggesting a different perspective from that of the libertarian 
property-vs-regulation logic. Alexander's21 concept of a property institution 
usually includes some sort of governance property that requires governance 
norms. This is in stark contrast to the idea that governance strategies22 exist 
only on the periphery of the property system.23 Inherent to the idea of human 
flourishing is its relational character, defined as a social-obligation norm – 
property holders must make the same normative commitment to developing 
others' capabilities that are required for human flourishing, as they commit 
to developing those capabilities in themselves.24  
This means that private property holdings are essentially entrenched in 
larger social structures that are geared towards the development of such 
capabilities that ensure human flourishing for all.25 The notion of human 
flourishing therefore requires some version of distributive justice that will 
provide individuals with certain forms of property that they need to develop 
the essential capabilities necessary for living a life with purpose.26 In 
Alexander's27 view, property owners must share  
… from their surplus, and in ways that are appropriate to them as property 
owners, to the communities to which they belong … those benefits that the 
community reasonably regards as necessary for development of the 
capabilities essential to human flourishing. 
Elsewhere Alexander28 clarifies that the state affords legal recognition to 
"asserted claims to resources". Human flourishing is therefore founded on 
                                            
21  Governance property is described by Alexander as "multiple-ownership property", 
whereas governance norms are devices that regulate the internal relations of 
ownership: Alexander 2012 U Pa L Rev 1856. 
22  Governance strategies are defined with reference to regulations that restrict the 
owner's essential right to exclude others. See specifically Merrill and Smith 2001 
Columbia L Rev 791-792, where they explain the choice between exclusion and 
governance as strategies for regulating the use of resources. 
23  Merrill and Smith 2001 Yale LJ 359; Merrill and Smith 2007 Wm & Mary L Rev 1850; 
Smith 2009 Cornell L Rev 963-971. 
24  Alexander 2009a Cornell L Rev 769. At 770 Alexander acknowledges that the social 
obligation cannot be a matter of strict reciprocity, at least not in the particulars of 
what we give back or to whom. The reciprocal obligation finds expression in the more 
abstract notion of citizenship: Alexander 2009a Cornell L Rev 771.  
25  Alexander 2009a Cornell L Rev 773-815 argues that private and public American 
property law has internalised as legal doctrines that are best explained as social-
obligation practices, meaning that private property owners owe "thick 
responsibilities" to their communities. He refers to the following examples to support 
his theory: eminent domain, nuisance remedies, land reform (particularly in South 
Africa), environmental conservation regulation, historic preservation regulation, 
access restrictions on the right to exclude, and some intellectual property law 
examples. 
26  Alexander 2013 HKLJ 457. 
27  Alexander 2013 HKLJ 458-459. 
28  Alexander 2009a Cornell L Rev 749. 
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the idea that certain "property" resources are required by each and every 
individual to nurture the capabilities that in fact constitute what is believed 
to be a well-lived life.29 This rationale also justifies distributive justice, which 
is centred on the principle that we should give people the required resources 
necessary to develop their capabilities in order to live a fulfilled life.30 Even 
though Alexander's exposition of human flourishing suggests at least to 
some extent that a range of essential values is embedded in the protection 
of property, which might be interpreted as some variation of the idea that 
property serves as a guardian of other rights, such a construal would be in 
contrast with the overall progressive-property argument.31 
The idea that property governance forms part of the institution of property is 
taken a distinctive step further by another progressive-property scholar, 
Singer,32 who argues that even though property is important for the 
attainment of individual liberty, the regulation of property forms an inherent 
part thereof. Private ownership brings about security and independence to 
its holder, which fosters individual liberty and the concomitant opportunity to 
acquire resources to live a meaningful, purpose-driven life, but individual 
ownership and a free market society will inevitably leave some outside of 
this individualised property system. State regulation is therefore called upon 
to mitigate such inequalities.33 According to Singer,34 the property system 
itself is a form of regulation, rather than an institution that stands in 
opposition to governmental strategies. The point of departure is therefore to 
consider ownership as consisting of both rights and obligations for an 
individual who operates in a free and democratic society,35 which differs 
from libertarian (defensive) or utilitarian (balancing) metaphors.36 Within this 
"law of democracy"37 model, property is structured in accordance with the 
fundamental choices that are made for living in a democracy that is 
characterised by dignity and equality.38 According to the progressive-
                                            
29  Alexander 2009a Cornell L Rev 768. 
30  Alexander 2009a Cornell L Rev 768. 
31  Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1037. 
32  Singer 2006 Harv Envtl L Rev arguably describes the role of state regulation in more 
expansive terms.  
33  Singer 2006 Harv Envtl L Rev 311. Also see Michelman 1992 U Chi L Rev 99; Singer 
Entitlement 141; Waldron Right to Private Property 4-5; and Barros 2009 NYU J L & 
Liberty 50-51. 
34  Singer 2006 Harv Envtl L Rev 312: "government action is needed to allocate initial 
entitlements, to define the bundles of rights that accompany ownership, and to 
adjudicate conflicts among owners and between property rights and other legal 
entitlements. Moreover, many forms of regulation exist precisely because they 
protect property rights". 
35  Singer 2006 Harv Envtl L Rev 314. 
36  Singer 2006 Harv Envtl L Rev 314. 
37  Singer 2014 Duke LJ. Also see Singer 2009 Cornell L Rev. 
38  Elsewhere Singer argues that "the democratic model of property focuses our 
attention on the need to make normative judgments about the appropriate contours 
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property theory,39 as articulated by scholars such as Alexander and Singer, 
the concept of property is defined by the fundamental values and obligations 
that underlie social citizenship as well as life in a democracy that enables 
all citizens to live life to the full.  
The social obligation inherent in the very concept of property finds 
expression in state regulation (common law or legislation) of the range of 
entitlements associated with property, including its acquisition, use and 
disposal. The regulation of property should ideally express the interplay 
between the protection of extant property holdings, being a locus for its 
holders' human flourishing, and the entrenchment of social obligations, 
which is part of social citizenship.40  
The progressive-property theory is well-crafted for not only the American 
constitutional framework, but also for South Africa, where rights to land and 
housing are entrenched as justiciable, positive rights. Property is included, 
like its American counterpart, as a negative right, however. Even though the 
constitutional protection of property can create the impression that property 
concerns the autonomy/enhancement of the individual and that the 
regulation of property poses a threat against such liberty and personhood, 
the progressive-property theory explicitly precludes this impression by way 
of its conceptualisation of property as being inherently regulatory. The 
portrayal of property as the law of democracy implies that the regulation of 
property does not threaten extant property holdings, but rather forms part of 
a web of tensions between property rights and other fundamental rights and 
values that are embedded in the very fabric of a constitutional system.41 
                                            
of property relationships in a free and democratic society": Singer 2009 Cornell L 
Rev 1057. 
39  Progressive property scholars mainly argue that there is more to property than just 
exclusion; inherent to property is the idea that the institution of property should be 
changed to be in line with societal interests. "Progressive property can be 
understood as both a reaction against the particularly strong influence of economic 
approaches to the law and an assertion that property law making must be more 
nuanced, more expressly political, and less preoccupied with the owners right to 
exclude. By rejecting the idea that the scope of concern should be limited to 
efficiency and utility maximization, scholars create more space to contest values": 
Rosser 2013 CLR 109, 110. In contrast, conservative scholars such as Thomas 
Merrill and Henry Smith argue that the informational value of rules such as the right 
to exclude cautions against amendments to existing rules and principles: Rosser 
2013 CLR 108-109. 
40  Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1042. 
41  Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1042-1043. This construal is also in line with 
the German Federal Constitutional Court's interpretation of the Grundgesetz (GG) – 
Basic Law of the Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland) 1949. In Germany the property guarantee "creates and protects a 
sphere of personal freedom, described in the laws that determine the content and 
limits of property, within which private property holding is both possible and justified 
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Unique to the South African legal framework is the constitutional protection 
of land and housing rights, which are both high on the constitutional agenda. 
"Explicitly guaranteeing land and housing rights in the bill of rights also 
creates the interpretative and strategic problem of sorting out the 
relationship between the general property guarantee and specific land and 
housing rights."42 The point of departure when considering the relationship 
between the protection of property and the strengthening of land and 
housing rights should be to avoid the libertarian and rights-based property 
theory that suggests that these constitutional aims are necessarily in conflict 
with each other. The constitutional analysis of these rights should also side-
step the facetious assumption that other constitutional rights, such as land 
and housing, should be brought under the protective realm of the property 
clause due to the popular belief that it is the "strongest" right.43 
3  The South African framework: property and housing 
3.1  A progressive-property approach 
Alexander44 expresses the opinion that the South African property clause 
incorporates a "thick" social-obligation norm that is directed at land reform 
and social justice. In addition, and perhaps even more strikingly, is the 
socio-economic right of access to adequate housing. The South African 
property clause, section 25, protects extant property rights against 
unconstitutional state actions by prohibiting arbitrary deprivation 
(subsection 25(1)) and uncompensated expropriation (subsection 25(2) and 
25(3)). The remainder of section 25 entrenches the constitutional 
commitment to land reform (subsections 25(5)-(9)), which includes the 
restitution of land rights;45 the redistribution of land;46 and the general 
strengthening of insecure land rights.47 As argued elsewhere, section 25 
should be read as a coherent whole, taking into account its historical and 
constitutional context,48 to both protect property and serve the land reform 
objective. In terms of the progressive-property theory, land reform statutes 
that regulate existing property rights should not be considered to be 
extraordinary interferences with established rights, but rather part of the 
                                            
in its proper social context, which explicitly includes the promotion of social welfare": 
Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1043. 
42  Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1044. 
43  Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1044. 
44  Alexander 2009 Cornell L Rev 782-783. 
45  Section 25(7) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution). 
46  Section 25(5) of the Constitution. 
47  Section 25(6) of the Constitution. 
48  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 15-23. 
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constitutional concept of property in a transformative setting that is driven 
by the constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom.49 
The socio-economic right of access to adequate housing is included in 
section 26 of the Constitution and is phrased as a positive right which the 
state is obliged to fulfil within its available resources. As mentioned in the 
preceding section, arguments have been put forward by progressive-
property scholars to suggest that certain kinds of property are worthy of 
more extensive protection than others, on the basis that they allow the 
individual to develop and experience the capabilities that are necessary to 
live a fulfilled life. The only kind of property that has been explicitly identified 
to fulfil this function is the home. For progressive-property theorists, property 
rights that relate to one's home require greater protection since this kind of 
property is constituent of the individual's self-development. In the South 
African framework, questions that relate to a heightened level of protection 
for extant property rights that relate to the home (or even another type of 
property) have not been adequately dealt with by the courts, nor has this 
matter been theorised by constitutional law scholars.50 The Supreme Court 
of Appeal has rejected the notion that the "home" deserves greater 
protection than other rights or societal values, however.51 Instead, the 
section 26 right of access to adequate housing has been interpreted, on 
many occasions, as providing protection to vulnerable occupiers of a range 
of dwellings, including shacks erected on vacant land, absent any rights to 
property.52 Basic forms of protection from eviction have been located under 
                                            
49  Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1046-1047. 
50  The only case that has touched on this issue is Lester v Ndlambe Municipality 2014 
1 All SA 402 (SCA), which is dealt with in the subsequent footnote. 
51  In Lester v Ndlambe Municipality 2014 1 All SA 402 (SCA) para 17 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal decided that eviction proceedings (s 26(3)) must be interpreted 
against the backdrop of the right of access to adequate housing (s 26(1)). 
Households who face eviction orders can rely on s 26(3) only if they are so socio-
economically weak that they might be rendered homeless due to the eviction order. 
The principle established in Lester is that the protection of the owner's home does 
not necessarily carry a greater value, from a normative perspective, than other public 
values, which in this case concerned the need to uphold the law and allow for a 
demolition order where building works were illegal. Any alternative allowance would 
have condoned a criminal offence: para 27. In Malan v City of Cape Town 2014 6 
SA 315 (CC) the majority of the Constitutional Court also held that an elderly 
woman's home interest is not necessarily more important than the City's "zero-
tolerance approach to drug dealing being conducted at any of its rental housing 
units": para 57.  
52  The ways in which the courts provide protection to vulnerable occupiers varies from 
deciding against an eviction order to granting the eviction order, whilst placing a 
positive duty on the state to provide the evictees with alternative housing. See for 
instance President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 
2005 5 SA 3 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 
(CC); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC). 
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the housing provision rather than the property clause,53 probably because 
the rights/interests are in fact not recognised as established property rights. 
3.2  Uncertainties in the regulatory context 
Considering the progressive-property theory, which describes the purpose 
of property as both to protect extant property rights and to allow for the 
distribution of property, fundamental questions emerge about the regulation 
of property in the South African framework. It is not clear whether land rights, 
including that of the home, should necessarily be subject to severe forms of 
state regulation in order to give effect to the land reform and housing 
provisions. Within this transformation-orientated setting, where extant 
property rights are protected to some extent, Singer suggests that a range 
of choices must be made to reflect both pragmatic economic and political 
needs as well as fundamental values. As a point of departure, it cannot be 
assumed that all "established property rights" must be protected.54 Instead, 
the property system must make it realistically possible for each person to 
acquire the resources necessary to live a full, humane life. If this structural 
objective cannot be obtained, individuals are deprived of the freedom that 
justified the creation of property rights in the first place. "In a society that 
has chosen to reject apartheid as a way of life, property rights must not only 
be redistributed but also tailored to enable equal liberties to emerge."55 
Moreover, decisions that relate to the regulation of property, including 
expropriations, are not necessarily concerned with the "singling out" of 
certain cases, but rather founded on fundamental normative choices 
regarding the rights (and obligations) of owners in a specific political 
arena.56 Central to the progressive-property theory is the tension that exists 
between stability (the protection of established property rights) and change 
(the need for regulation, taking the form of distribution), which requires some 
dialogue on when regulatory actions would be permissible and when not; 
and for what purposes. A dialogue of this kind has arguably not taken the 
form that it should in South Africa. 
Foundational questions remain before we can make any real claim on our 
constitutional concept of property, its purpose and the way in which it relates 
(or should relate) to the constitutional right of access to adequate housing.57 
                                            
53  See Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1062-1063 for the argument that housing 
interests should be protected in terms of s 26 of the Constitution, rather than s 25, 
because the protection of property interests should play a modest, secondary role 
as against s 26. The argument is also put forward to suggest that the South African 
property clause is not intended to allow individuals to flourish. 
54  Singer 2014 Duke LJ 1312. 
55  Singer 2014 Duke LJ 1312. 
56  Singer 2014 Duke LJ 1321. 
57  This right is directly related to the state's mandate to distribute land. Once access to 
land has been established it is highly likely that the beneficiaries will also be able to 
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Firstly, it is essential for us to at least start to think about different types of 
property and the concomitant levels of protection that should be afforded to 
them. Some types of property should arguably receive a heightened level 
of protection on the basis that they are constituent of their owners' 
autonomy, identity and place in society. The state should therefore be 
cautious to regulate rights of this kind, beyond the levels that one would 
expect in our sensitive constitutional and political arena. This does not mean 
that the property clause is mainly intended to allow individuals to flourish, 
regardless of the circumstances.58 Instead, stringent regulatory 
interferences with established property rights should allow for a context-
sensitive approach to determine the purpose of the specific type of property 
and the place that it fulfils in society.59  
On the other hand, the second, related question is when should property 
rights be regulated more extensively? Certain types of property should 
arguably be prone to more severe forms of regulation, depending on the 
relevant circumstances. Finally, it is inconceivable that a clear distinction 
could be drawn between the protection of property and the realisation of the 
section 26 right of access to adequate housing, because a direct connection 
exists between these constitutional rights once beneficiaries have been 
provided with some form of housing. Such beneficiaries will mostly, if not 
always, be provided with a property right that relates to a residential 
structure. The constitutional protection that the beneficiary would be entitled 
to would consequently be located under the realm of the property clause 
rather than the housing provision, because the latter is concerned with the 
right of access to adequate housing, more than with the protection of 
established housing rights.60  
From a human flourishing perspective, one should fairly easily be able to 
argue that a section 26 beneficiary's established housing interest must 
                                            
reside on the land. Stated differently, it is inconceivable to provide both land (in terms 
of s 25) and housing (in terms of s 26) to the same beneficiary by way of two different 
state-sanctioned programmes; the one would necessarily have to rebut any claim to 
the other.  
58  In Lester v Ndlambe Municipality 2014 1 All SA 402 (SCA), the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was arguably correct to state that a housing interest will not necessarily trump 
other public interests or values. However, this does not mean that the value of the 
home, of any individual (socio-economically weak or not), should be ignored when it 
becomes subject to stringent regulatory control. The home of the ill, disabled or 
elderly, regardless of financial standing, may be critical to the holder's very survival. 
A residential structure of this kind is constituent of its holder's very existence and 
cannot be compared with what was essentially a holiday home in Lester's case. 
59  This idea is explained in more detail in subsequent paragraphs. 
60  Plenty of eviction cases have been decided in terms of s 26 to provide some 
protection to vulnerable evictees, although none of these cases concerned the 
protection of established housing rights that were awarded in terms of s 26(1). Also 
see Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1075. 
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receive a heightened level of constitutional (property) protection on the 
basis that it constitutes a person's home and it exemplifies more than one 
of our fundamental constitutional objectives.61 If this argument stands, can 
we say that some homes should receive greater protection than others, 
simply because they typify transformation-orientated, redistributive efforts? 
If so, are we adhering to the constitutional values of human dignity and 
equality? 
3.3  The way forward 
The South African evictions framework shows that property rights are often 
regulated to provide some form of protection to destitute groups' housing 
rights/interests. Deprivations of this kind are mostly temporary, non-
intrusive limitations that are placed on landowners' property rights and they 
are easily justifiable since they are non-arbitrary and in accordance with 
larger constitutional imperatives. Such regulatory actions are authorised in 
terms of anti-eviction strategies that are provided for in the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 on an 
ad hoc basis due to destitute households' pure desperation.62 Interferences 
of this kind are not part of the state's formal housing programme, since they 
arise at random to prevent increased homelessness.63  
A more severe form of regulatory interference can, and arguably should, be 
specifically tailored to give effect to section 26. Some of the protective 
measures in section 25 (section 25(1)-(3)) as well as the transformation-
driven provisions in section 25 (section 25(4)-(9)) authorise the state to 
expropriate property to provide permanent housing solutions to the 
marginalised. Strategies of this kind are already authorised in section 25(2)-
(3), supported in enabling legislation and geared to fulfil the redistribution 
mandate (section 25(5)) as well as the housing obligation (section 26(1) and 
(2)).64 Intrusive regulatory state actions that do not necessarily amount to 
                                            
61  The housing imperative is deeply connected with the s 10 right of human dignity and 
the s 25(5) right of access to land. 
62  In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 37 the Constitutional Court stated that "[u]nlawful 
occupation results in a deprivation of property under s 25(1). Deprivation might, 
however, pass constitutional muster by virtue of being mandated by law of general 
application and if not arbitrary. Therefore, PIE allows for eviction of unlawful 
occupiers only when it is just and equitable." 
63  Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1070. 
64  In terms of the Housing Act 107 of 1997, municipalities can expropriate land (by 
notice in the Provincial Gazette) if it is required for a housing development. S 9(3) of 
the Act stipulates the requirements, such the inability of the state to purchase the 
land. S 6 of the Housing Development Agency Act 23 of 2008 allows the Minister to 
expropriate land for the development of human settlements. S 25 of the Constitution 
requires that compensation must be paid, and the expropriation must be in the public 
interest. Both the redistribution programme and the progressive realisation of access 
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formal, permanent expropriations can also be construed in terms of section 
25(2), which is traditionally considered to form part of the "protective" 
measures in the property clause.65 
A core purpose of the South African Constitution is to redress the grave 
injustices of the past, which were to a large extent orchestrated by way of 
the unfair, race-based regulation of property (specifically with regard to 
land). The property clause is therefore unsurprisingly instrumental in 
permitting severe forms of regulatory state action to provide the previously 
dispossessed not only with access to land/housing, but also with the means 
to live fulfilled lives. The regulation of property by way of both deprivation 
and expropriation is therefore not only in accordance with land reform 
imperatives and the right to acquire adequate housing, but is instrumental 
in giving effect to these constitutional rights. This does not mean that 
established property rights should not be protected. It means that, in 
addition to placing the protection of property rights in a modest role 
secondary to the fulfilment of vulnerable groups' housing rights,66 the 
regulation of property should receive ample revision from both the executive 
and the legislature to suggest ways in which innovative, purpose-driven 
regulatory state actions can address housing needs on a permanent basis. 
In order to take the conversation further and analyse the dual role of our 
constitutional property clause, specifically in a transformative setting, a 
more concise concept of property is called for. 
4  A purpose-driven interpretation of property 
In response to the idea that property serves as the most important right in 
the American constitutional order,67 Underkuffler68 acknowledges that 
                                            
to adequate housing, which is included as a socio-economic right, are in the public 
interest: Viljoen 2014 TSAR Part 1 360-362. 
65  The state is, for instance, able to expropriate an owner's right to use his land, albeit 
temporarily if it is in the public interest. A regulatory interference of this kind would 
amount to a formal expropriation, but it will affect the owner's right to use his land 
only temporarily. In terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, the Minister of Public 
Works is empowered to "expropriate any property for public purposes or take the 
right to use temporarily any property for public purposes". S 12 of the Act makes a 
clear distinction between the expropriation of an owner's property and the taking of 
a right to use property; which affects the way in which compensation should be 
calculated. If the state decides to expropriate the holder's use right, the amount of 
compensation shall not exceed "an amount to make good any actual financial loss 
caused by the expropriation or the taking of the right". See specifically Viljoen 2014 
TSAR Part 1 366-367, 371-376; Viljoen 2014 TSAR Part 2 528-533. 
66  Van der Walt and Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1069. 
67  Rose 1996 Notre Dame L Rev. 
68  Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Notre Dame L Rev 1034. Underkuffler expresses the 
opinion that property should not be protected more rigorously than other rights on 
the basis that it is special.  
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property is indeed a special right, but only in the sense that the institution of 
property is the most compromised; having often to adhere to other 
constitutional rights and values. This means that property should be given 
a more complex, contingent interpretation than other constitutionally 
protected rights. Property is also special in the sense that it involves a 
choice regarding the allocation of resources, which means that whenever 
resources (sometimes finite, non-shareable resources) are given to some, 
they are inevitably denied to others.69 The allocation of such resources is 
essential since some types of property are necessary for human survival, 
which renders property, once again, special in the sense that the realisation 
of other constitutional rights may depend on one having some property.70  
Based on this reasoning, Underkuffler71 calls into question the constitutional 
protection of property as a negative right. If property is indeed foundational 
to one's ability to exercise other constitutional rights, should a right to 
property not be included as a positive claim? Furthermore, does it even 
make sense to protect extant property holdings if the state is required to 
upset such holdings for the sake of social and economic reform?72 The 
constitutional protection of property may place it beyond the reach of 
democratic power, which is contrary to the overall need to amend property 
allocations.73 Overall, Underkuffler74 argues that property which involves 
goods critical to life should in fact be "less protected as a right, not more. If 
property is to be less protected, how much less protected should it be?" 
Several uncertainties highlighted by Underkuffler in the American 
framework are addressed to some extent in the South African Constitution 
by way of the property clause and the housing clause. Together these 
provisions place a positive obligation on the state to progressively ensure 
that previously dispossessed persons are provided with land/housing.75 
Access to land by way of the redistribution programme and access to 
adequate housing are a priori considered fundamental in the overall 
transformation imperative, but these positive rights are also indicative of the 
types of property that are essential if individuals are to be allowed to take 
                                            
69  Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Notre Dame L Rev 1038. In comparison with other 
constitutional rights, such as free speech, which does not carry any allocation costs, 
Underkuffler believes that the allocation aspect of property necessarily involves 
some cost to society: 1039. 
70  Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Notre Dame L Rev 1039-1040. 
71  Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Notre Dame L Rev 1041. 
72  Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Notre Dame L Rev 1042. 
73  See specifically Michelman 2016 Brigham-Kanner Prop Rts Conf J for concerns 
raised in relation to the inclusion of a property clause. 
74  Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Notre Dame L Rev 1043. 
75  Sections 25(5) and 26 of the Constitution. 
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their rightful places in society.76 It is indeed difficult to imagine how 
individuals would be able to reap the benefits of the range of constitutionally 
recognised rights if they do not have a place to live.77  
That being said, it remains unclear when and to what extent the regulation 
of extant property rights should allow for the realisation of both land reform 
and housing imperatives. Embedded in the idea of property is the notion 
that owners bear social obligations towards not only their direct 
communities, but also to society at large.78 By way of state-ordained 
impositions, which take the form of both deprivations and expropriations, 
the state is tasked to regulate property in order to give effect to its land 
reform and housing objectives, which essentially means that the state 
should determine, in an ongoing manner, where owners' obligations should 
begin and end. It is within this context of establishing an acceptable balance 
in a variety of cases between the protection of extant rights and the fulfilment 
of constitutionally endorsed land-related objectives that we need to initiate 
a dialogue that aims to provide clarity on when certain types of property 
should be subject to severe regulation and when not.79 The work undertaken 
by progressive-property theorists, specifically that of Alexander, should 
arguably be taken as our point departure to think about the purpose of 
property and how it should influence our approach to regulating it.  
The notion of human flourishing, as a theoretical approach to the justification 
for having property rights, suggests that certain types of property are 
constituent of the individual. One could even say that properties of this kind 
are at the core of people’s ability to flourish and take their rightful places 
amongst others. Alexander identifies the home as such a type of property, 
without taking the matter any further. The paradox in the arguments raised 
by progressive-property scholars, which they themselves acknowledge, is 
that the very foundation for protecting properties of this kind is also the 
                                            
76  Sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution therefore establish a public right/claim to the 
existence of a property system in respect of certain valued objects. Land/housing is 
considered to be such an object, although it is not entirely clear whether these 
provisions necessarily provide beneficiaries with private property rights. 
Nevertheless, property is undoubtedly a systemic right. See specifically Michelman 
1981 Clev St L Rev 585.  
77  A place where one can reside can take the form of either a residential structure or a 
piece of land which can be put to such use. 
78  See specifically Alexander 2013 HKLJ 451-462. 
79  It is generally accepted that minor interferences with owners' property and 
specifically land rights are non-arbitrary and in line with s 25 of the Constitution when 
the purpose is to provide some protection for vulnerable evictees: Van der Walt and 
Viljoen 2015 PELJ 1069. It remains unclear, however, what normative 
considerations should be taken into account when more intrusive regulatory 
interferences would be directed at landowners' rights in order to give effect to ss 
25(5) and 26. 
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justification for regulating them.80 Others are also, as a matter of human 
dignity, entitled to flourish, meaning that the state should regulate such 
resources to ensure access for all. In the South African framework, the finite 
resource that the previously dispossessed are entitled to is land, which can 
also take the form of a home. The value of this type of property is by no 
means contested. Neither is the political will to conform to the 
constitutionally recognised redistribution and housing mandates.  
It is doubtful, however, whether the value that is attached to land in terms 
of section 25 (and section 26) extends to extant land holdings, even when 
the land also constitutes the holder's home. Should the normative 
commitment to allowing others to flourish as a matter of human dignity not 
also apply to "ourselves"? If so, certain types of property should require 
greater constitutional scrutiny when being subjected to severe regulatory 
action, based on the notion of human flourishing. If we agree that the home 
is an important type of property for the purpose of self-development, surely 
other types of property, such as family farms held across generations, 
should also be considered essential in the pursuit of living a fulfilled, 
meaningful life. Depending on the circumstances, the latter type of property 
may justify even greater protection on the basis that it is often constituent of 
more than one family's autonomy.81 It may be integral to other constitutional 
rights, such as the right to practise one's religion by visiting burial sites,82 
and it may form an important part of our economy, contributing not only to 
food security but also to job security. From a human flourishing perspective, 
properties of this kind cannot be isolated from the unique socio-economic 
purpose that they fulfil by simply categorising them as "land".  
In the US takings framework, Michelman83 makes a similar point with 
reference to Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit,84 which he 
uses as an example of a "case in which the compensation solution for a 
conflict between property and police power [was] unavailable even in 
principle". Michelman85 describes Poletown as "the sort of case in which the 
injury suffered by the aggrieved owner is one for which money cannot 
compensate, because the injury is to some interest of the owner's apart from 
economic net worth". The state's use of its eminent domain power was in 
                                            
80  Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Notre Dame L Rev 1044. 
81  Farms that provide housing to labour tenants or farm workers, often for one 
generation after the other, are arguably constituent of the occupiers' individual 
autonomy in the sense that the farm, which represents the occupiers' homes, place 
of work and immediate community, enables such occupiers to enhance their self-
development and rightful place in society.  
82  See for example Nhlabathi v Fick 2003 ZALCC 9 (8 April 2003) and specifically s 
6(2)(dA) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
83  Michelman 1981 Wash & Lee L Rev 1111. 
84  Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit 304 NW 2d 455 (1981). 
85  Michelman 1981 Wash & Lee L Rev 1111-1112. 
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this case directed at entire neighbourhoods, which included individuals' 
homes. The purpose of the taking was to convey the land to General Motors 
in order to construct an assembly plant. In this instance, the affected 
property represented more than what a monetary payment could remedy; it 
represented "things" that money could not buy: 
… place, position, relationship, roots, community, solidarity, status – yes, and 
security too, but security in a sense different and perhaps deeper than that of 
… 'reasonable investment-backed expectations'.86 
In the end, a choice had to be made, either giving effect to the owners' 
property and security or allowing the police power to serve the general 
welfare, because compensation was unable to mediate the conflict.87 
Poletown serves as an example of a case where the type of property that 
was subject to the state's power of eminent domain constituted part of the 
owners' ability to take their rightful places in society because it represented 
not only their homes but also their way of life as a thriving community. 
Michelman believes that the payment of compensation could not remedy 
the taking of this type of property and what it effectively represented, 
suggesting that when certain types of property are being put to use to reach 
certain ends, severe governmental interference may be inappropriate, 
regardless of the public purpose it intends to serve.88 
On the other end of the spectrum, certain types of land, including some 
residential premises, are by no means constituent of the holder's individual 
autonomy. Land and buildings that are left vacant over lengthy periods of 
time, often subject to deterioration, thereby constituting a threat to others' 
health and safety, serve as an example of the type of property that should 
perhaps be subject to more severe forms of regulatory control.89 
Landowners who fail to maintain their premises, produce from their land or 
simply neglect to adhere to what one would generally refer to as their social 
obligations should arguably be exposed to some or other "punishment" in 
the form of either stringent taxation or expropriation.90 Land, and specifically 
well-located residential premises,91 are finite non-shareable resources that 
                                            
86  Michelman 1981 Wash & Lee L Rev 1112. 
87  Michelman 1981 Wash & Lee L Rev 1112. 
88  Michelman 1981 Wash & Lee L Rev 1112. 
89  See specifically Strydom and Viljoen 2014 PELJ 1207-1261 for the argument that 
vacant inner-city buildings should be expropriated by the state. This argument is 
supported by some comparative analysis. 
90  See Strydom and Viljoen 2014 PELJ 1207-1261 for the argument that unlawfully 
occupied, neglected buildings should be expropriated by the state and Viljoen 2014 
TSAR Part 1; Viljoen 2014 TSAR Part 2 for the proposition that the state should also 
consider its power to take control of neglected inner-city buildings for housing 
purposes by expropriating owners' use rights, albeit temporarily. 
91  See for instance Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC); City of Johannesburg 
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lie at the heart of our constitutional challenge. The protection of these 
resources means that we consciously decide not to allocate them to 
others.92  
From the perspective of human flourishing, it seems incoherent and illogical 
to simply talk about "land" or "buildings" when trying to seriously converse 
about our concept of property and its constitutional purpose in relation to 
redistribution and housing objectives. The actual use of land or buildings, 
representing the type of property that is high on our constitutional agenda, 
indicates the extent to which the property forms part of its holder's ability to 
self-develop and lead an active, purpose-driven life. In the light of our 
evictions jurisprudence, it seems that we are already inclined to protect 
some types of property that are being put to certain uses more stringently 
than other types when faced with the challenge of having to weigh property 
rights against vulnerable groups' housing interests, although the reasons for 
doing so remain obscure.93 What we arguably require is more concise 
standards, not rules, to determine when and to what extent property should 
be protected more strictly and when property should be subject to more 
severe forms of regulatory action to give effect to long-term land and 
housing solutions.94 Key to this conversation is the factual purpose of the 
piece of property in society, which is intrinsically linked to the notion of 
human flourishing.  
A factual enquiry directed at the use of the property over a lengthy period of 
time not only by the landowner but also by other affected parties should 
arguably be made to determine the "place" that the specific piece of property 
                                            
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 
(CC). 
92  Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Notre Dame L Rev 1038. 
93  In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) the Court 
decided against the eviction of unlawful occupiers who invaded vacant, unused land. 
A key consideration in the case was the fact that the owners never asserted that they 
required the land for their own use. It was also clear that the land was not being put 
to any use at the time that the occupiers took occupation, nor during the eight years 
that the occupiers resided there: paras 55-51. In contrast, see for instance City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitcan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) para 24, where the Court granted the eviction of unlawful 
occupiers who resided in a inner-city building that had been purchased with the 
intention to develop it. At no point did the owner fail to maintain its building or neglect 
to use it. Instead, it motivated the eviction of the occupiers in order to both use it in 
a productive manner and to maintain it. 
94  Underkuffler 2015 Tex L Rev 2020 states that "there must be some situations in 
which government can permanently, physically invade private land without the 
payment of potentially ruinous compensation". The US Supreme Court has even 
held that the value of property may be destroyed, without compensation, if it is in the 
public interest: Miller v Schoene 276 US 272, 277-279 (1928). Underkuffler 2015 Tex 
L Rev 2027 questions the approach of the US courts when dealing with takings 
issues on the basis that it is "devoid of articulated, explored, or principled guidelines". 
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occupies in society. The proposition here is that such an enquiry cannot be 
made in the abstract.95 Instead, a factual analysis considering all relevant 
circumstances should be made in every case to determine whether or not a 
specific piece of property should be subjected to severe regulatory control, 
and to what ends. This does not mean that we should refrain from taking 
part in some dialogue that is intended to provide standards when regulating 
property for certain constitutional objectives.96 Property is indeed a social 
right and we as a society need to converse about the reasons why we 
decide to reward the claims of some individuals to finite goods when we also 
decide to deny claims to the same goods by others.97 
As articulated by Underkuffler,98 we need to determine, in each contested 
case: 
– What are the values, theoretical and practical, that underlie the protection of 
the individual's interest in this case?  
– What are the values, theoretical and practical, that motivate the public 
(collective) to institute change? 
– Taking what we have found – the reasons for the protection of this property, 
and the reasons for change – should we require the payment of 
compensation? 
5  Concluding remarks 
Embedded in the very notion of any property institution is the idea that 
holders of property have rights and obligations. The latter is inherently 
connected to the social demands of society; property must not only be put 
to the service of the community, but it must also be regulated in accordance 
with its needs. Property will also be protected, but not all types of property 
in all instances. Some property is necessarily subject to greater 
governmental control, whereas other property requires more stringent 
protection. The notion of human flourishing as a normative foundation for 
property suggests that property is intended to allow individuals to take their 
                                            
95  See Michelman 1981 Wash & Lee L Rev 1109, where Michelman states that the 
idea of property is nonspecific, and that judges must supply content to the term. 
When doing so, judges help to resolve conflicts between state power and property 
rights, provided that the concept of property must be understood as an essential 
component of holders' opportunity to participate in political processes where 
fundamental values are accommodated.  
96  Underkuffler 2015 Tex L Rev 2028 expresses the opinion that the core function of 
the US takings clause is to protect private property "from radical changes in the 
status quo, without sufficient justification." It is not always clear, however, what 
property is, what qualifies as a radical change, and what one would consider to be 
sufficient justification. What might be required in this area of constitutional law is 
perhaps therefore "fewer rules and more standards": 2028. 
97  Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Notre Dame L Rev 1046. 
98  Underkuffler 2015 Tex L Rev 2036. 
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rightful place in society and enhance their self-development. This 
justification applies to owners and non-owners, which means that the 
distribution of property forms an essential part of the very concept of a 
private property institution. Certain types of property are constituent of 
individual autonomy, which seems to justify greater protection than those 
that are not, but a "type" of property can surely not be decisive in 
determining whether or not it is conducive to the idea of human flourishing. 
We can all agree that once a residential dwelling is indeed used as a home, 
it will probably constitute a type of property that allows the household to take 
its rightful place in society and flourish.99 The particular use of a certain type 
of property should arguably be taken into account when determining 
whether or not stringent governmental control should be allowed. 
In South Africa the type of property that is subject to strict governmental 
control due to its previous use and ability to provide individual autonomy is 
land/housing. This type of property must be distributed to the previously 
dispossessed by way of regulatory state action, but it remains unclear in 
what circumstances it would be justifiable to simply reallocate property 
rights of this kind. The purpose of this paper is to offer a theoretical 
perspective on the normative foundation of some property rights, based on 
work done by progressive-property scholars, with the purpose of initiating a 
dialogue concerning whether or not such rights should be regulated. The 
notion of human flourishing should arguably be essential in determining 
whether land/housing rights should be subject to greater constitutional 
scrutiny. The more property contributes to an individual's autonomy and 
ability to partake in social relations, the more sceptical we should be of 
severe governmental interference, whereas the lesser the notion of human 
flourishing appears, the greater governmental interference should be. An 
approach of this kind adheres to the systemic purpose of section 25 of the 
Constitution, because the property clause is intended to regulate 
established rights just as much as it is intended to meet certain societal 
needs. Its "protective" clauses are instrumental in meeting land reform and 
housing objectives. It is surprising, however, that we have not seen cases 
that deal with the state's power to expropriate property, nor severe forms of 
regulatory control to meet land/housing objectives. 
Perhaps the time is ripe for us to deliberate not only on the types of property 
that must yield to severe governmental interference to meet the state’s land 
                                            
99  This is not necessarily always the case; there are instances where the home is not 
conducive to the individual's development. The home can also be a place of violence 
and oppression: Schnably 1993 Stan L Rev. Being mindful of this important 
qualification, the proposition is still that when certain types of property are being 
utilised accordingly, they may very well be constituent of individual autonomy and 
self-development. An in-depth, factual analysis is required in each instance to 
determine whether this is indeed that case. 
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reform and housing objectives, but also the purposes that they fulfil from a 
human flourishing perspective. We cannot allow for finite non-shareable 
resources to remain unused, unproductive or even under-utilised. Such an 
allocation, whether deliberate or unintentional, would be at odds with our 
vision of a transformed legal order, since it would effectively sanction 
irresponsible landownership. Singer is correct in saying that all established 
property rights cannot be protected, but then of course some must be 
protected. The determination of such a class of property rights is arguably 
just as important as determining those that should yield to greater regulatory 
interference. It is inconceivable to think that property rights that are 
constituent of the individual's self-development and place in society should 
be treated as any other form of property. Such a construal would lead not 
only to inhumane, unjust outcomes, similar to those we saw in Poletown,100 
but also to the unequal application of the law.  
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